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LTI@UniTO and Fondazione
Collegio Carlo
Alberto
are pleased to
invite you to
the following
seminars
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March 1, 2022 | 12:00 - 13:15 @ HYBRID EVENT
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Firm-bank
linkages and
optimal
policies in a
lockdown
Anatoli
Segura, Bank
of Italy
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Abstract. We develop a novel
framework
featuring loss
amplification
through
firm-bank
linkages. We
use it to
study optimal
government
support in a
lockdown that
creates
heterogeneous
revenue losses
to firms,
which must
borrow from
banks. Firms’
increase in
debt reduces
their output
due to moral
hazard. Banks
need safe
collateral to
raise funds.
Without
government
support,
aggregate risk
constrains
bank lending,
amplifying
output losses.
Optimal
support
provides
sufficient
aggregate risk
insurance, and
is implemented
with
firm-specific
transfers,
fairly-priced
guarantees on
bank debt, and
countercyclical firms’ taxation to achieve a fiscal surplus target. Our
results shed
light on
suboptimality
dimensions in
the actual
policy
responses.
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To attend in presence, register here
To attend online, join zoom meeting
Meeting ID: 882 8185 7502
Passcode: 161878
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March
2, 2022 |
16:00 - 17:15
@ WEBINAR
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Schumpeterian
Competition in
a Lucas
Economy
Daniel Andrei, McGill
University
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Abstract. We model a
rent-seeking
game where
agents
experiment
with a new
technology and
compete for
claims to a
consumption
stream. We
characterize
how creative
destruction
affects risk,
wealth, and
asset prices.
Competition
not only
imposes
excessive
disruption
risk on
existing
assets and
higher
technological
uncertainty,
it also
increases the
wealth
duration (the
weighted-average maturity of the consumption stream). Because of hedging
motives, a
complementarity
between wealth
duration and
technological
uncertainty
decreases
systematic
risk. If
competition is
sufficiently
intense, a
negative risk
premium may
arise. The
model
generates
price paths
consistent
with boom-bust
patterns and
transient
episodes of
negative
expected
excess
returns. We
discuss the
implications
of competition
for income
inequality.
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To attend online, Join Zoom Meeting
Meeting ID: 823 7890 1875
Passcode: 423048
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INFORMATION
UNDER THE NEW GENERAL
DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION (GDPR)
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information has been
gathered for the exclusive
purpose of informing you
about the Collegio's
initiatives, considering
our and your legitimate
interest or your consent.
If you wish to have your
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please contact Fondazione
Collegio Carlo Alberto,
piazza Arbarello 8, 1022
Torino, Italy - phone:
+390116705000 -
privacy@carloalberto.orgTo find out about the
policies regarding the
processing of personal
data pursuant to articles
13-14 of EU Regulation
2016/679, consult the
information at the
following link https://www.carloalberto.org/privacy/
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© 2021 Fondazione
Collegio Carlo Alberto
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