On behalf of the Scientific Committee of The de Finetti Risk Seminars - on the Mathematical Theory of Economics and Finance in Milano, we are glad to invite you to participate at the "de Finetti Risk Seminar" on
April 9, 2014 at 18.00 with the Lecture
Equilibrium in risk sharing games
COSTANTINOS KARDARAS
London School of Economics
Abstract: We study equilibrium sharing of investment risk among agents whose random endowments constitute private information. Given the sharing rules that optimally allocate the submitted endowments, we propose a Nash game where agents' strategic choices consist of the endowments to be submitted for sharing. It is proved that the best response problem admits a unique solution (which we call "best endowment response") and differs from the agent's true risk exposure. Then, we proceed in showing that the Nash equilibrium risk sharing admits a finite dimensional characterisation, and that it exists and is unique in the case of two agents. Analysis shows that the game benefits the agents close to risk neutrality, since their expected utilities are higher at the Nash risk sharing equilibrium than the optimal risk-sharing one. (Joint work with Michail Anthropelos.)
LOCATION: The seminar will be held on Wedsnesday, April 9, at 18.00 at Sala di rappresentanza, Department of Mathematics, Milano University, Via Saldini 50, Milano.
A refreshment will be offered at 17.30.
Scientific Committee:
Prof. Marco Frittelli (Univ. degli Studi di Milano) Prof. Fabio Maccheroni (Univ. Bocconi) Prof. Massimo Marinacci (Univ. Bocconi) Prof. Emanuela Rosazza Gianin (Univ. Milano-Bicocca) Dott. Simone Cerreia-Voglio (Univ. Bocconi) Dott. Marco Maggis (Univ. degli Studi di Milano)
******************************************************************************************* Emanuela Rosazza Gianin Dipartimento di Metodi Quantitativi per le Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali Università di Milano Bicocca Edificio U7 - 4° Piano Via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi, 8 20126 Milano
Tel. 02 64483208 Fax. 02 64483105 e-mail: emanuela.rosazza1@unimib.it
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