On behalf of the Scientific Committee of The de Finetti Risk Seminars - on the Mathematical Theory of Economics and Finance in Milano, we are glad to invite you to participate at the "de Finetti Risk Seminar" on
March 19, 2014 at 18.00 with the Lecture
A continuous auction model with insiders
GIULIA DI NUNNO
University of Oslo
ABSTRACT In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the signal of a firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset. The fundamental value itself is announced at some future random stopping time. We consider the two cases in which this release time of information is known and not known to the insider. We study the structure of the optimal insider's strategies in equilibrium and we discuss market efficiency in the two cases of insider's information. Some examples of explicit insider's strategy will be provided. This is joint work with Jose Manuel Corcuera, Gergely Farkas, and Bernt Øksendal.
LOCATION: The seminar will be held on Wedsnesday, March 19, at 18.00 at Aula Chisini, Department of Mathematics, Milano University, Via Saldini 50, Milano.
A refreshment will be offered at 17.30.
Scientific Committee:
Prof. Marco Frittelli (Univ. degli Studi di Milano) Prof. Fabio Maccheroni (Univ. Bocconi) Prof. Massimo Marinacci (Univ. Bocconi) Prof. Emanuela Rosazza Gianin (Univ. Milano-Bicocca) Dott. Simone Cerreia-Voglio (Univ. Bocconi) Dott. Marco Maggis (Univ. degli Studi di Milano)
******************************************************************************************* Emanuela Rosazza Gianin Dipartimento di Metodi Quantitativi per le Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali Università di Milano Bicocca Edificio U7 - 4° Piano Via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi, 8 20126 Milano
Tel. 02 64483208 Fax. 02 64483105 e-mail: emanuela.rosazza1@unimib.it
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