Dear all, On Tuesday, 17 December 2019 — at 11:30 — at the Scuola Normale Superiore (Room: Aula Bianchi Scienze) Prof. Luciano Campi (London School of Economics) will hold the following Seminar: Title : Correlated Equilibria and Mean Field Game Abstract: Mean field games are limit models for symmetric N-player games, as N tends to infinity, where the pre-limit models are solved in terms of Nash equilibria. A generalization of the notion of Nash equilibrium, due to Robert Aumann (1973, 1987), is that of a correlated equilibrium. Here, we discuss, in a simple non-static setting, the mean field game limit for correlated equilibria. We give a definition of correlated mean field game solution, prove that it arises as limit of N-player correlated equilibria in restricted (”open-loop”) Markov feedback strategies, and show how to construct approximate N-player equilibria starting from a correlated mean field game solution. We also compare our definition to the one by Lacker (2018) of weak solutions for mean field games without a common noise. (Joint work with Markus Fischer, Padova University) Fill free to forward this announcement to your colleagues. Best Giulia Livieri Assegnista di ricerca Scuola Normale Superiore Piazza dei Cavalieri, 7, 56126 Pisa PI room 65