Dear Colleagues,

It is a pleasure to announce the cycle "Women in Mathematical Finance" co-organized with Daria Ghilli from the Department of Economics and Management, University of Pavia, and Gabriele Cedrani, alumnus of the Collegio Ghislieri.

The venue is Collegio Ghislieri, Aula Goldoniana, Piazza Ghislieri 5, Pavia.

Wednesday, November 27, 2024, 6:00 - 8:00 PM CET Prof. GIULIA LIVIERI (London School of Economics) An Overview on Mean Field Games and Applications

Wednesday, February 19, 2025, 6:00 - 8:00 PM CET Prof. SARA SVALUTO-FERRO (Università di Verona) Signatures in Finance: Life, Death, and Miracles

Thursday, March 13, 2025, 6:00 - 8:00 PM CET Prof. GIULIA IORI (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia) Networks and Agent-Based Modelling in Finance

Monday, March 17, 2025, 6:00 - 8:00 PM CET Prof. BEATRICE ACCIAIO (ETH Zurich) Beyond Models: Exploring Model-Independent Finance via Optimal Transport

Monday, March 31, 2025, 6:00 - 8:00 PM CET Prof. GIORGIA CALLEGARO (Università di Padova) Stochastic control and recent applications to cybersecurity: A quick guided tour

On the same days, the speakers will give a talk at the Department of Economics and Management, Via San Felice al Monastero, 5 Pavia.

Giulia Livieri will give the first seminar.

Wednesday, November 27, 2024, 1:30 - 2:30 PM CET, Sala del Consiglio Prof. Giulia Livieri, London School of Economics A Mean Field Game approach for pollution regulation of competitive firms

Abstract: We develop a model based on mean-field games of competitive firms producing similar goods according to a standard AK model with a depreciation rate of capital generating pollution as a byproduct. Our analysis focuses on the widely-used cap-and-trade pollution regulation. Under this regulation, firms have the flexibility to respond by implementing pollution abatement, reducing output, and participating in emission trading, while a regulator dynamically allocates emission allowances to each firm. The resulting mean-field game is of linear quadratic type and equivalent to a mean-field type control problem, i.e., it is a potential game. We find explicit solutions to this problem through the solutions to differential equations of Riccati type. Further, we investigate the carbon emission equilibrium price that satisfies the market clearing condition and find a specific form of FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type with common noise. The solution to this equation provides an approximate equilibrium price. Additionally, we demonstrate that the degree of competition is vital in determining the economic consequences of pollution regulation. Joint work with G. Del Sarto and M. Leocata.

We look forward to meeting you in Pavia. Kind Regards, Giacomo Bormetti

Giacomo Bormetti Department of Economics and Management, University of Pavia